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(SO) WHAT IF IT'S ALL JUST RHETORIC? 
FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT: PRACTICAL 
REASONING, CHARACTER, AND THE ETHICS OF 
BELIEF. By Eugene Garver.1 Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press. 2004. 264 pp. $22.50. 
David McGowan2 
Rhetoric gets a bad press in legal analysis.3 To call a passage 
in an opinion "rhetoric" is to damn it as insincere or insubstan-
tial- unworthy of serious scholarly interest. Rhetoric is often set 
up in opposition to logical analysis or principle. When that hap-
pens, the writer always claims to have logic or principle on her 
side. Rhetoric is what the other side uses. I analyze, you de-
scribe; he is a mere rhetorician. 
It is wrong to dismiss rhetoric this way. Aristotle defined 
rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in any given case the avail-
able means of persuasion,"4 and logic is one of those means. In 
Aristotelian rhetoric, logos is a powerful tool of persuasion. It is 
employed through enthymemes (a type of syllogistic argument) 
and inductive reasoning.5 In Aristotelian terms, to say a passage 
is "rhetoric" does not imply that it is unreasoned. Aristotelian 
rhetoric goes beyond logic, of course. It includes ethos (persua-
sion derived from the character of the speaker), and pathos (per-
I. Regents Professor of Philosophy, St. John's University. 
2. Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. Thanks to Brian Bix, 
Dan Farber, Gene Garver, Nelson Lund, John McGinnis, and Miranda McGowan for 
their comments. Remaining mistakes are my fault. 
3. There are exceptions, of course, including prominent discourse-based theorists 
such as Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, 
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003), and PHILIP HOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: 
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982), and scholars from disciplines less professionally 
antagonistic to rhetoric, such as James Boyd White, Law As Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law, 
The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CJU. L. REV. 684 (1985), or STANLEY 
FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE (1999). 
4. ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric 1. ii 1355', in THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF 
ARISTOTLE 24 (W. Rhys Roberts & Ingram Bywater trans., 2d ed. 1984). 
5. ARISTOTLE, supra note 4, at 26. 
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suasion based on sentiment). Most dismissals of rhetoric seem to 
have these approaches in mind. 
Why do we dismiss rhetoric? I think it is because of an aspi-
ration and a fear. The aspiration is that many of us want law to 
be logical, not based on a speaker's character, appeals to senti-
ment, or society's sheep-like acceptance of whatever judges say. 
(Why we want this is an interesting question; more on that later.) 
The fear is that, in the real world, law is nothing like this. It 
never has been, it never will be, and society gets along just fine 
all the same. 
With regard to constitutional law, which will be the subject 
of my examples here, fear is probably the wrong word to use. 
There is no use denying that constitutional law is more than lo-
gos. The real question is whether logos matters at all. In a recent 
article, Professors Nelson Lund and John McGinnis say it is a 
"noncontroversial positive point" that "constitutional law is 
whatever the Supreme Court can get away with saying it is. "6 It 
is hard to argue with their point. The Court makes constitutional 
law up as it goes along and, I would add, it always has. John 
Marshall was a Federalist. He handed down Federalist rulings, 
which is what John Adams expected and Thomas Jefferson re-
sented.7 It has been that way ever since. Have you heard? Lib-
erty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt, unless it's freed 
from its immanent dimension, so it may evade the animus and 
engage in an act of ceremonial deism before condensing into the 
critical mass.8 Logos? Give me a break. 
It is always good to admit the obvious, but there is still 
something in this "noncontroversial" description that cuts 
against the grain. It is thin gruel for a job in which the absence of 
client demands leaves time for reflection. Call it a matter of taste 
on my part, but there is something squalid and unappealing, 
something base, in the idea that the justices just whisper sweet 
nothings in our ears to get us to comply with their commands. It 
would be nice to think constitutional law is on a higher plane 
than high school dating. It's enough to turn mainstream constitu-
6. Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 
MICHL. REV. 1555, 1586 n.ll3 (2004). 
7. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 85-93 
(2003). 
8. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,844 (1992); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Allegheny 
v. ACLU 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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tiona! analysis into an updated version of Oliver Twist: Can't we 
have just a little bit more? 
Maybe rhetoric gets a bad legal press because it reminds us 
of something we would rather not think about. I know it is bad 
form to bring this up, but could it be that we spend our lives 
writing either about logical principles courts are not really inter-
ested in or about nothing more substantial than which phrases 
are best to dress up the next politically determined result?9 It 
would be hard to disprove this claim. Perhaps we should just 
admit that the practice of rhetoric is the turtle under the social 
construct of the law, and it's turtles all the way down. 10 
Perhaps it would not be a fatal admission. This brief (possi-
bly jaded) survey of The Way Things Are implies that the study 
of rhetoric itself might improve legal argument. Might it at least 
give us a basis for critiquing the Court's work? For the Sake of 
Argument: Practical Reasoning, Character, and the Ethics of Be-
lief, by Professor Eugene Garver, makes the case that it can. Pro-
fessor Garver is a professor of philosophy, not law, but he uses 
legal examples to argues for an ethics of practical reason. The 
hope of this approach is that it might provide a basis for ethical 
critiques of what the Court actually does. If nothing else, it pro-
vides a welcome alternative to endless hand-wringing over what 
the Court should do, but doesn't do, because what it does do 
works so well for it. For that reason alone, his thesis is worth 
considering. 
Professor Garver's book is learned, honest, and insightful. I 
am not aware of any work that makes such a strong case for 
ethical criticism of judicial reasoning. 11 It is the rare book that 
exemplifies its thesis. I doubt it will affect judicial practice. Judg-
ing in ordinary cases offers little room for the sort of ethical 
rhetoric Professor Garver describes, while in extraordinary cases 
people quite reasonably care more about the results than the 
case the Court has made for them, which few people read and 
fewer still really care about. Professor Garver's book should help 
9. That's why it's nice to teach a course in a field judges don't care about very 
much, so they will try to apply the law rather than dabble in high politics. I recommend 
Agency. 
10. See David McGowan, SCO What? Rhetoric, Law, and the Future of FlOSS De-
velopment (June 7, 2004) (Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 04-9, 
http://ssm.com/abstract=555851 ). 
II. That includes my attempt, David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of 
the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL Ennes 509 (2001), and other works that emphasize 
qualities such as candor in judicial writing. See, e.g., David Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial 
Candor, 100 HARV. L. REv. 731 (2001). 
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us come to terms with the role of rhetoric in real-world legal 
analysis. That is a considerable benefit. 
I 
An insight, a distinction, and a goal comprise the most in-
teresting and (to me, at least) most original aspects of Professor 
Garver's analysis. The insight has to do with the nature of ethos 
in Aristotelian rhetoric. The distinction is between ascertaining 
the available means of persuasion and the act of persuasion it-
self. The goal is to aim for truth rather than accommodation. 
A. DEVELOPING ETHOS THROUGH ARGUMENT 
Professor Garver draws three theses from Aristotle's Rheto-
ric: reasoning is the heart of persuasion, ethos (character) is the 
most powerful source of belief, and the power of ethos comes 
from the development of character through reasoning. Ethos 
here differs from reputation. A speaker's reputation may per-
suade some in the audience, but reputation is weaker than ethos 
developed in the course of an argument. A speaker who devel-
ops ethos through reasoning shows that she is of good character, 
and thus worth believing, rather than asking the audience to ac-
cept her worth on the faith of others, whose approval created her 
reputation (p. 7). Here is the key passage, from the Roberts 
translation of the Rhetoric: 
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character 
when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him more 
credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily 
than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, 
and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and 
opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion . . . should be 
achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think 
of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true ... 
that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contrib-
utes nothing to his power of persuasion. On the contrary, his 
character may almost be called the most effective means of 
. h 12 persuasion e possesses. 
There is an interesting ambiguity in this translation. The 
first sentence refers to a speaker who is able to make us "think 
him" more credible, which is not quite the same thing as reveal-
ing to us a character that actually is credible. Maybe the speaker 
12. ARISTOTLE, supra note 4, at 25. 
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in the first sentence is just good at faking goodness. The penul-
timate sentence refers to goodness "revealed" by the speaker, 
which implies a goodness that actually exists. Professor Garver 
(who does his own translations), translates the first sentence to 
refer to a speech spoken "to make the speaker worthy of cre-
dence," and the penultimate sentence to refer to "the worth of 
an orator" (p. 7). 
Consistent with his reference to a speaker who is "worthy" 
of being believed, Professor Garver makes a normative case for 
the role of ethos in practical reasoning. He contends that an ad-
vocate who develops ethos through reasoning "rationally inte-
grates is and ought." A speaker who develops ethos by reasoning 
with an audience acts as a friend toward the audience, inviting 
them to enter into a relationship of friendship with him. When 
the invitation works, friendship created through reasoning allows 
the audience "to understand emotional appeals as rational." Just 
as friendship goes beyond justice, though the two are related, so 
ethos goes beyond reason but is not irrational (p. 7). The "crucial 
distinction is between a~ argument which claims that a conclu-
sion follows from the nature of the good-a purely logical 
claim-and an argument which shows me inferring that same 
conclusion because of my commitment to the good-a demon-
stration that is simultaneously logical and ethical" (p. 106). 
There is much more to this thesis than might appear at first 
glance, especially if you dismiss out of hand (as I think many 
lawyers would) any argument that seems to rest on concepts of 
friendship rather than competition. You may recognize the truth 
in the argument from your own experience. Have you ever had a 
famous scholar show up for a lecture and toss off a few recycled 
bits of previous work that seem to have been jotted on an air-
plane napkin in no particular order? Even if the bits form a logi-
cal sequence, you will be less inclined to accept the argument 
than you would be if the speaker took the time to connect with 
you in some way. Reputation might get him in the door, but 
ethos still has to be earned through the argument itself. 
Recognizing this point does not clarify it. What, exactly, 
does it mean to say the development of ethos through reasoning 
creates relations of friendship that integrate is and ought, and 
why should we care about such a thesis? It may be easiest to an-
swer the first question by first answering the second. The payoff 
to this argument is an ethics that integrates self-interest with the 
need for collective action and social interaction. Because we are 
social creatures in a relatively advanced social state, persuasion 
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is ubiquitous. Because persuasion is ubiquitous, to the degree 
one cares about ethics it is useful to have a way of thinking about 
the ethics of how it is done. 
Persuasion is done most effectively when we demonstrate 
that we can be trusted to reason with (p. 146). We show we are 
trustworthy by taking responsibility for the propositions we as-
sert rather than trying to deflect responsibility somewhere else, 
thus denying that we make the choices we do in fact make. In 
addition, we show we are worth reasoning with by taking seri-
ously the interests and concerns of our audience. For Professor 
Garver, an ethical appeal is one in which I demonstrate that "I 
take your commitments and principles seriously, and join with 
you in reasoning from them" (p. 29). When we do that, we offer 
audience members a chance to engage us in a relationship of 
friendship which, in Professor Garver's argument, means dealing 
with each other on these terms, rather than getting what you 
want by fooling them or buying them off. 
We can get a more concrete understanding of this argument 
by thinking about how one might develop ethos through argu-
ment. An advocate who wishes to take advantage of the persua-
sive force of ethos has got to think about her audience. She has 
to understand their issues and concerns; what they value and 
hope for, abhor and fear. If the advocate can demonstrate that 
she understands the audience's interests and concerns, she may 
be able show them how a person of good character (in their 
eyes) could see things her way. Isn't that how you would want to 
be persuaded? 
This account of persuasion is quite powerful. At the risk of 
trivializing the idea with maxims, it seems a pragmatic mixture of 
walking a mile in the other person's shoes, doing as you would 
be done by, and doing well by doing good. Lawyers will instantly 
recognize elements of the argument in the appeals they craft for 
judges. Judges have to worry about precedent-what does a de-
cision in your favor commit them to in the future?-so you have 
to worry about precedent, too. You write your brief with an eye 
to the opinion you want the judge to write. You argue to the 
bench or box, but you argue from it as well. 
Professor Garver relates the means of developing ethos to a 
concept he calls "ethical surplus." The term refers to what Pro-
fessor Garver believes is the marginal persuasive effect that 
ethos adds to the logic of an argument. "Practical reason gener-
ates an ethical surplus that allows us to affirm and be committed 
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to more than reason would allow" (p. 75). Thus, the conclusion 
of an ethical argument is and should be stronger than the argu-
ment itself13 (p. 75, 79). The example of "straw man" arguments 
provides an intuitive sense of this point. If I attack a position we· 
both know no one holds, my argument as a whole will suffer. 
This fact has nothing to do with my logic, because "arguing 
against a straw man violates no logical rules" (p. 101). But you 
would be right to be more wary of my argument if I attack cari-
catures than if I do not. 
Professor Garver uses Brown v. Board of Education to illus-
trate how ethical reasoning can create an ethical surplus (p. 6, 
10). His account of Brown will seem counterintuitive to most 
lawyers-indeed, it will seem completely backwards-so it is 
worth close attention. Professor Garver thinks Brown is a para-
digmatic example of ethical judicial reasoning because the Court 
took responsibility for its decision and the vision of equality it 
articulated, rather than pretending that either the decision or the 
vision were compelled by precedent. He sees Brown as "an act 
of commitment," by which he means the Court could have 
constructed an opinion that deduced the violation of equal 
protection from constitutional text, history, and precedent, 
but for a case as monumental as Brown such a deduction 
would have been perceived as the Court hiding behind legal 
precedent and not taking responsibility for the decision. Find-
ing the history inconclusive makes the Justices more respon-
sible for their opinion. The Court presents the opinion as 
ethically necessary and inevitable precisely because it is not 
necessary and inevitable by narrow logical and legal criteria 
(p. 77). 
Extrapolating from this point gives you the proposition that 
the opportunity for ethical judicial argument varies inversely 
with the degree to which a decision is actually compelled by law, 
which is indeed Professor Garver's view (p. 79-80). That idea 
will strike most lawyers as crazy, especially those who think 
judges betray the judicial office if they do anything that is not 
compelled by law, which is to say if they do anything for which 
they might take personal responsibility. 
13. We may also think of ethos as supplying a rule of decision. Aristotle said we 
believe good men more fully and readily than others, especially "where exact certainty is 
impossible and opinions are divided," which is to say in most general cases and in all the 
big constitutional cases. /d. If logic cannot determine a choice, something else must, and 
the development of ethos is a strong candidate for that something else. 
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Because this idea is at odds with conventional legal think-
ing, I want to begin by saying why I think it has to be right. Not 
all cases are occasions for ethical argument, a fact Professor 
Garver stresses {p. 79). If a foreign-born governor tried to run 
for president as a naturalized citizen, the Court would deny any 
claim he might make, and it would be hard to write an opinion 
that would provide room for ethical criticism. The Constitution 
just doesn't leave any room for argument on the question 
whether a foreign-born naturalized citizen can be president. It's 
not that the Constitution says nothing, as in Roe, or something 
that might be literally ambiguous, as in Brown, but that it says 
"no." For that reason, most of the opinion in such a case would 
be a statement of the obvious ("no" means "no"). It would re-
port more than it would persuade. 
Reporting requires few choices, so it is right to say that 
where decisions are compelled by law there is little room for 
ethical criticism. By parity of reasoning, where neither law nor 
logic compels a particular decision, judges must choose which 
path to follow and how to explain their choice. Those choices are 
proper subjects of ethical criticism, and the manner in which the 
decision is explained is the proper subject of rhetorical criticism. 
Many decisions are pretty well compelled, so this point limits 
substantially the number of cases to which Professor Garver's 
thesis applies, In cases where neither law nor logic dictates the 
result, however, his thesis provides a useful analytical point of 
VIeW. 
Nevertheless, people who do not like creative judging-
which is all of us when it is our ox being gored-will and should 
worry about this idea. 14 The notion that the Court's rulings may 
exceed its logic if it reasons properly is and should be slightly 
frightening. The "ampliative" power of the "ethical surplus" 
generated by the rational development of ethos might tempt 
some judges to judge amuck. Mastering rhetoric might turn them 
into the sort of Platonic guardians conservatives have decried for 
years, and which liberals have started to decry as judges get 
more conservative.15 
Professor Garver is aware of this risk. He says the "creative 
side of practical reasoning is potentially irresponsible. Only the 
14. I reject the term "judicial activism" as meaningless; it has been worn out by 
constant use on all sides of every issue. 
15. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of An Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Pan Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002). 
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ethos of the community and the judgments of the audience keep 
it in check" (pp. 200-01). Such judgments keep "autonomy from 
becoming license" (p. 201). There is something to Professor 
Garver's response. He did not invent creative judging, the judges 
did. He is entitled to take the Court as he finds it, and it is a sig-
nificant merit of his book that he offers a way to think about the 
ethics of creativity rather than opting for nihilism or judicial hy-
pochondria about when the sky might fall if the Court continues 
to do what it has always done. Having said that, I do not think 
his response deals fully with the objection, because the con-
straint on which he relies probably does not apply to judges. I 
will return to this point in Part II. 
First, however, I want to charge Professor Garver with par-
tisanship in order to acquit him on most counts of the charge. 
Though the gap is closing, 16 conservatives still complain more 
about creative judging than liberals. A theory that links ethics to 
creativity will strike conservatives as liberal partisanship. In the 
few cases that might call for ethical reasoning, Professor 
Garver's notion of commitment and taking responsibility for 
one's reasoning does cut against conservative approaches to 
judging. He believes that to argue purely from precedent "denies 
any serious objections to one's actions" (p. 98), and he cites 
Judge Bork's confirmation hearings as showing that "substitut-
ing reasoning alone for character denies personal responsibility 
by purporting to remove agency and present oneself as part of a 
chain of necessary connections" (p. 105). This approach would 
be fine for the foreign-born citizen case, but not for Brown. Pro-
fessor Garver refers to "original intent" judging as "mindless le-
galism," which does not sound very complementary (p. 184). 
Not surprisingly, the aspects of Brown that make it ethical 
for Professor Garver are most troubling to conservative scholars. 
Professor (now Judge) Michael McConnell, who believes "the 
supposed inconsistency between Brown and the original mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment has assumed enormous im-
portance in modern debate over constitutional theory," com-
plains that "such is the moral authority of Brown that if any 
particular theory does not produce the conclusion that Brown 
was correctly decided, the theory is seriously discredited." 17 
Thus, the Court's concession that the historical record regarding 
16. /d. 
17. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947,952-53 (1995). 
870 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:861 
school segregation was inconclusive, which "once was seen as a 
weakness in the Supreme Court's decision in Brown is now a 
mighty weapon against the proposition that the Constitution 
should be interpreted as it was understood by the people who 
framed and ratified it,"18 which appears to be one reason why 
Professor McConnell devoted considerable effort to constructing 
a revisionist originalist defense of the decision. The concession 
that troubles Professor McConnell is the key to what Professor 
Garver sees as the ethical aspect of the opinion (p. 76). 
Whatever the merits of Professor McConnell's originalist 
defense of Brown, 19 he is right about the stakes. Professor 
Garver praises Brown as "a perfect example of what ethical rea-
soning looks like at its best" in part because "the ethos of the 
opinion ... opened up a new role for courts, government, and 
community that went far beyond the desegregation order" (p. 
10). He is right about that. Brown paved the way for Loving, and 
not even Professor McConnell has tried an originalist defense of 
Loving.20 
This point marks a clear and important difference. The 
"new role" Professor Garver sees Brown as creating for the 
Court is of course exactly what worries conservatives, which is 
why it is important for them to craft a narrative that accommo-
dates the result in Brown without endorsing judicial creativity. 
Professor Garver does not fault Brown for refusing to commit to 
all the implications of its premises, because "[p]ractical reason 
takes place in time. Deciding one practical issue creates new 
ones," which we might see coming but which we cannot deliber-
ate about "until we face them as real practical predicaments" (p. 
78). That kind of open-ended claim of power, unconstrained by a 
pledge to adhere strictly to logic, drives conservatives nuts.21 
Professor Garver may be read as offering two responses to 
this charge of partisanship. One is that he believes there is a dif-
18. /d. 
19. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements 
On Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2365 (2002) 
("Virtually no one has been persuaded by McConnell's learned account"). 
20. See id. ("[N]either McConnell nor Bork has defended either Bolling or Loving 
as consistent with original meaning, nor could they easily do so."). 
21. As I write, exactly the same thing is happening with regard to whether Law-
rence v. Texas implies anything about same-sex marriage. The Court says "we'll see," 539 
U.S. at 578. Liberals do not mind that, Post, supra note 3, at 104-05, and the Court's re-
fusal to commit to following its premises where they lead drives conservatives crazy. See, 
e.g., Lund & McGinnis, supra note 6. (Though in this case a failure to commit probably 
makes them less crazy than a promise would). 
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ference between constitutional argument and personal prefer-
ence, such that a judge who reasons ethically is in fact engaging 
in constitutional interpretation, rather than just winging it. "Tak-
ing responsibility" for an argument "does not mean being willful 
or arbitrary. The Justices engage in Constitutional interpreta-
tion. But they do not pretend that the Constitution is simply 
speaking through them"(p. 80). Instead, "the ethos internal to 
the practices of constitutional argument is a spirit committed to 
reading the Constitution as a constitution, not as the business-
man reads a contract. If I read the Constitution ethically, then I 
am committed to recognizing the other forms of argument as 
well. That commitment is a powerful new form of political 
friendship" (pp.l72-73).22 
A second response is that Professor Garver is concerned 
with the means of persuasion, not the target. On his account it is 
entirely possible for a conservative judge to argue ethically for 
strict adherence to original meaning, precedent, or whatever else 
the judge wants to adhere to. Professor Garver would insist only 
that there must be such an argument, in which the judge takes 
responsibility for his choices and acknowledges that they are 
choices rather than asserting that his position is so self-evidently 
true that no one else's views are worth mentioning. Thus-and 
now we can make liberals uncomfortable-by Professor 
Garver's lights it would be perfectly possible to write an ethical 
opinion in Brown that upheld segregation. In the ethics of rheto-
ric, the choice that matters is the means of persuasion, not the 
end for which persuasion is employed. 
Nevertheless, as a purely practical matter it is easier to ac-
cept personal responsibility for decisions if you believe your job 
is to make decisions for which you might be personally responsi-
ble. If you do not, then you have an uphill climb in Professor 
Garver's system of ethics. Presumably you could reason ethically 
about why you think you should not make such decisions, but 
that sort of meta-argument is likely to get drowned out in argu-
ments over the issue at hand. The Bork confirmation hearings, in 
which Judge Bork's reasons for originalist judging were drowned 
22. This line of argument implicitly takes the position that "interpretation" encom-
passes more than a search for the intended meaning of the author of a text. I think it 
would be better to restrict the term "interpretation" to that search, see Steven Knapp & 
Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CR.mCAL INQUIRY 723 (1981), and evaluate on 
the basis of whether the results are good or bad (and by what measure) any decision 
based on something other than a search for the author's meaning. 
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out by popular disagreement with his results, exemplify this 
point. 
B. DECIDING HOW TO PERSUADE 
I said earlier that Professor Garver's argument is based on 
an insight, a distinction, and a goal. The distinction is between 
ascertaining the available means of persuasion and actually per-
suading someone (pp. 51, 123). When you have ascertained the 
means of persuasion available in a particular case, you still have 
to choose among them. Because the choice affects your relations 
with others, Professor Garver views it as a proper subject for 
ethical analysis. 
Professor Garver is right to treat this choice as an ethical 
matter. His analysis improves our understanding of how persua-
sion affects the way we see each other and deal with each other. 
It is obvious that we are social creatures who specialize in differ-
ent things, so it is obvious that we will need to persuade others to 
get what we want. It is not obvious why we should care about 
how we persuade them, or even that we should persuade them 
rather than manipulate them. Utilitarianism may rule out fraud, 
but that leaves a lot of room for discretion. What of flattery? 
What of pathos? John Edwards made millions literally channel-
ing the voices of dead infants in medical malpractice trials.23 If 
it's good enough for a vice-presidential nominee, why isn't it 
good enough for the rest of us? 
Professor Garver confronts this question in a fascinating 
chapter entitled "Confronting the Sophist." Professor Garver 
claims Aristotelian rhetoric, with its emphasis on reason and the 
development of ethos through reasoned argument, is ethically 
superior to sophistic rhetoric, which aims only to persuade and is 
indifferent to how persuasion is accomplished in a particular 
case. Why should we prefer Aristotelian to sophistic rhetoric? 
Because rhetoric "is tested not only by success in persuasion, but 
by the kind of relations between speaker and audience each 
[kind of rhetoric] engenders" (p. 56). Aristotelian rhetoric "can 
have ethical relations between speaker and hearer." It "creates 
and sustains community, while sophistic cannot" (p. 55). Take 
away Aristotle's limitations that reason must predominate in ar-
gument, and that ethos should be developed through reason, and 
23. Adam Liptak & Michael Moss, In Trial Work, Edwards Left A Trademark, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,2004, at Al. 
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"I must be the audience's master or its slave. I can have com-
mercial relations, or military relations, but not ethical ones" (p. 
55). Looking at the question from the audience's point of view, I 
can want to be persuaded, but I cannot want to be manipulated 
(p. 63), so "the sophist who wants to persuade me through im-
ages and irrational appeals has to pretend to convince me that he 
is persuading me through argument .... such rhetoric is inher-
ently deceptive ... " (p. 58). 
In a moment I am going to play the vulgar skeptic and ask 
what is so great about community, but first I want to stress that 
Professor Garver is right to say that the choice of the means of 
persuasion is an ethical choice. Reasoning with you from com-
mitments and principles that you yourself hold shows more re-
spect for you than simply steering you my way by finding your 
blind or weak spots. Developing my ethos through argument re-
quires me to open myself up to you by showing that I am com-
mitted to at least trying to see how you see things. I may or may 
not persuade you to join me in working through an issue-that is 
up to you- but that does not matter. If I reason ethically I treat 
you as a friend and therefore at least have a chance to deal with 
you in friendship. If I opt for sophistry, I have no chance at all. 
Comparative advantage is the only kind. 
I think all that is quite true. But opening myself up to you-
investigating your interests and concerns and working candidly 
on your turf-takes time and effort. It is harder than simply tell-
ing you what I think you want to hear. If I am good enough at 
knowing what you want to hear, and at hiding the fact that I 
don't care about your interests and concerns, only your agree-
ment, I will do as well as if I argue ethically, so why should I 
bother? Sure I can help engender friendly, community-building 
relations, but I do not reap the marginal benefit of the commu-
nity's welfare, so why should I incur any cost to enhance it? Eth-
ics need not produce marginal benefits, so this point does not 
undermine Professor Garver's thesis as a purely ethical matter. 
Practical reason is practical, however, so an ethics of practical 
reason has to be concerned with practicality, too. Unless I value 
community enough to bear costs out of proportion to my own 
marginal benefits, self-interest poses a practical problem for re-
alizing the benefits the thesis wants to make possible. 
So now I want to subject Professor Garver's thesis to the 
vulgar skeptic: What is so great about community? What if I 
don't really want to be in a community with you? What if would 
rather beat you into submission than talk to you, which I will do 
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only because I am worse off going to jail than manipulating you 
through sophistry? I might reason with you, if that is what works 
most effectively, but I don't really care one way or the other. 
I know, I know, this kind of question leads to infinite re-
gress. We can always ask what is so great about the end we pur-
sue, but we have to pursue some end or life is pointless, so why 
not just lose the sophomoric skepticism and get on with it? But 
the premise of this line of Professor Garver's argument is that a 
heterogeneous society has to reconcile sharply differing views. 
Deliberating is nice-it is what professors are supposed to do 
best-but lots of things are nice, and in a world of scarcity 
choices must be made. So why do ethics require the marginal in-
vestment in the development of ethos through reason when there 
is no guaranteed payoff in terms of community (that is up to the 
audience, which may not care about all your effort) and a work-
ing (if un-friendly) accommodation could be had at lower cost? 
Even on the most unsettled and most ethically charged 
questions-perhaps especially on such questions-it is not at all 
clear to me that we are better off with deliberation than with ac-
commodation. Everyone knows that foundational arguments can 
be offensive and disruptive. Suppose you believe the Bible is lit-
erally true, and homosexuals are sinners. If I can persuade you 
that the Bible is not literally true, and that homosexuals are just 
ordinary people like you and me, you will have to re-arrange 
much more than a single opinion. You will have reason to won-
der whether there is a God, which may change every aspect of 
your life. You will wonder whether you are as virtuous as you 
thought you were when you thought you were better than gays, 
and you will come face to face with your own fallibility. It would 
be a serious mistake to underestimate the degree to which many 
white Southerners saw Brown as a boot in the face rather than as 
an act of friendship. It was. 
In one of his more recent books (it is never safe to say most 
recent), Judge Posner provides an interesting report on this 
question. He says that, in his experience, judges talk least about 
the most sensitive cases because those are the ones most likely to 
breed anger among persons who have to live and get along with 
each other.24 They do not deliberate, though their shared educa-
tional and professional backgrounds would seem to make them 
ideal candidates for deliberation. I am not surprised. Judges get 
paid to decide cases, their dockets are always full, and if the pay-
24. POSNER, supra note 7, at 129,139. 
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off from ethical reasoning is not high enough, it is better just to 
decide and move on. 
C. TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES? 
My cost-benefit argument in the last section is good as far as 
it goes, but it understates the strength of Professor Garver's case 
because it leaves out an important consideration. In contrasting 
deliberation and accommodation, I implicitly treated everyone's 
interests, commitments, and aspirations as fixed. In economic 
terms, I portrayed a static model of persuasion. The world is not 
like that. People change their minds. They may even decide to 
pursue an end they once condemned. Many people once 
thought-hell, they knew-that Blacks were inferior to whites. 
Many people thought women were not suited for work and 
should stay home and raise children, and that gays and lesbians 
were damnable deviants on the fast track to Hell. Not any more. 
Where do preferences and commitments come from? Why 
do people hold the ones they hold? How do preferences and 
commitments change? These are the most important questions 
we can ask about practical reasoning?5 They raise the third point 
I mentioned above, which is the aim of persuasion. Professor 
Garver believes ethical reasoning can aim at truth rather than 
just the accommodation of interests. He sees liberalism as aiming 
at agreement among free persons rather than at truth, which is 
too divisive a subject for a liberal state to pursue (pp. 14, 21). 
"The success of liberal democracy depends on lowering one's 
ambitions from seeking truth to settling for agreement" (p. 14). 
In contrast, "ethical argument creates essentially civic relations 
between people. Reason becomes thickened from consistency to 
integrity" (p. 30). Why? Because, "rhetorically, we don't trust 
people who agree with us, or who look like us, but trust in peo-
ple whom we think are engaged with us in a common project" 
(p. 33). 
This idea will sound as peculiar to the legal ear as the notion 
that courts reason ethically in inverse proportion to the support 
they derive from conventional legal sources. Like that notion, 
however, this one carries an important insight. Professor Garver 
believes that "aiming at agreement may avoid civil war, but the 
prejudices of the powerful get to constitute common know!-
. 25. They are pretty important for utilitarianism, too, for in many cases these ques-
tiOns bear on what will count as utility and disutility. 
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edge." Thus, "outsiders naturally feel the loss of truth more 
heavily than the powerful. The powerful have no reason not to 
be satisfied with agreement" (p. 26). 
Professor Garver offers South Africa's Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission as an example of what he means. The 
Commission made public (through epideictic rhetoric) accounts 
of the crimes of apartheid which Blacks knew to be true but 
which whites had denied. Because whites had had the power, 
their denials were the "authorized version" of the truth of apart-
heid. Professor Garver believes that by aiming for truth rather 
than trying to accommodate different interests, the TRC "re-
placed the false official opinions that held together the old South 
Africa with new truths it found by being more inclusive about 
what counts as rational" (p. 27). 
The notion of "inclusive rationality" is enough to worry 
many people, including me.26 Professor Garver is not endorsing 
total relativism, however. His point is that by adding to the store 
of public knowledge about apartheid the stories of Blacks who 
previously could not get a hearing, the TRC provided a means 
for integrating their stories into mainstream political discussion 
in a way that allowed whites to understand rationally the pathos 
of the stories. Rational integration of pathos helped develop a 
community ethos that reinforced that rationality. The knowledge 
of individual persons became the knowledge of all, and so rein-
forced the knowledge of individuals and changed the way they 
dealt with each other (p. 39-41). I do not know enough about 
South Africa to know whether, as Professor Garver says, 
through the TRC "South Africa persuaded itself that it was a 
democratic nation, and so became one" (p. 42), but one can see 
how that could be true. 
Aiming at truth rather than agreement can help us reason 
about ends rather than just means. Reasoning about ends can 
change the terms on which accommodations are reached, which 
is one way of understanding Professor Garver's claim that ethi-
cal reasoning integrates is and ought. Professor Garver makes an 
important contribution by connecting the reasoned development 
of ethos to the ability of persons with different beliefs to reason 
together about ends. 
26. It reminds me of a put-down one of my law school professors directed at an-
other student (for a change), and which I still cherish: "So you're saying this is not the 
result of mere reason, but a deeply held personal belief?" 
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I am skeptical of the practical aspects of this claim, however. 
For one thing, I am not sure that even ethical argument can get 
very far without some common ground between speaker and au-
dience. The easiest way to argue ethically in Professor Garver's 
sense of the term is to find a commitment or principle you have 
in common with your audience. Professor Garver does not im-
pose such a restriction on ethical argument, however. He re-
quires only that you reason with a person about their commit-
ments, not that you hold them, too. In fact, he argues that 
"rhetorically, we don't trust people who agree with us, or who 
look like us, but trust in people whom we think are engaged with 
us in a common project. ... The more we trust in reasoning, the 
less we need to worry about shared ends, shared values, and pre-
supposed truths" (p. 33). 
I don't think this is how things really are, at least in legal ar-
gument. How do we know the speaker is engaged in a common 
project with us other than by concluding that we have at least 
some things in common? We at least have to have a shared in-
teresting reasoning together about an issue. I will come back to 
this point in Part II. For now I note only that litigation is almost 
never a common project from the litigants' point of view; to the 
extent litigants represent the views of segments of society, as in 
cases like Brown, Roe, or Lawrence, litigation is not a common 
project for society, either. 
It is one thing for me to take your commitments seriously, 
but a very different thing to take seriously only the fact that you 
have such commitments. I cannot take seriously a commitment 
to the literal truth of the Bible. I take very seriously the fact that 
some people are committed to Biblical literalism. If I am honest, 
the best I can do is accept that commitment, as Professor 
Garver's title has it, for the sake of argument. Even that is risky, 
though, because what I am willing to accept for the sake of ar-
gument reveals something about my character, and accepting 
something for the sake of argument implies that it is worth con-
sidering (p. 100). 
These facts create two problems. First, there are some in-
terests and commitments I will not honestly accept, even for the 
sake of argument. If you believe the Bible is literally true, that 
homosexuals are sinners bound for Hell, that tolerance of them 
condemns us in the eyes of God (which is why God allowed the 
attacks of September 11 to succeed),27 and that homosexuals 
27. I'm not making it up. See Gavin Esler, Christian Evangelists With A Touch of 
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therefore should be locked up in an asylum/8 I will either not 
deal with you, tg to get the force of law on my side (as in Law-
rence v. Texas),2 or manipulate you with sophistic rhetoric. We 
are too far apart for friendship on this question, and it would be 
a waste of time to try.30 
Second, even if I accept for the sake of argument Biblical 
literalism and the sinfulness of homosexuality, if you know 
where I stand why should you trust me? You know I deny that 
which you affirm, and you would be right to infer that whatever I 
say about the Bible is going to point you in my direction. I will 
know that before agreeing to argue on your turf; why would I 
agree otherwise? In theory, of course, I could agree because I 
am willing to open myself to the literal truth of the Bible, but 
that would entail re-wiring years of education. Do I really have 
to be prepared to toss Hume out the window just to talk to you? 
Not likely. If I am that open-minded, I have to wonder whether I 
have a brain or a sieve. (I would expect you to say the same 
about the Bible.) Professor Garver faults Aristotle for consider-
ing how speakers should persuade but not how audiences should 
listen (p. 6), but the question of why you should trust me in such 
circumstances remains unanswered. 
These points limit the advantage ethical reasoning can claim 
over logos. Professor Garver distinguishes ethical reasoning 
from logical appeals based on authorities the audience accepts. I 
can catch you in a logical contradiction among Bible verses, for 
example, or between your actual practice and Biblical teaching, 
and urge you to take a consistent position. (I will, of course, urge 
you to reconcile the consistency my way.) You might plausibly 
see that sort of argument as insincere and accusatory, which is 
very different from developing my ethos by reasoning together 
with you. But if I reason only about beliefs that you hold but I 
do not, what else am I supposed to do but catch you in contradic-
tions or make you retreat in the face of counter-examples? 
As a practical matter, if I want to reason with you instead of 
at you, it seems I can do is one of five things. I can argue logi-
the Taleban, THE SCOTSMAN, Nov. 30, 2001, at 18. 
28. As one judge (!) in Mississippi believes. See Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial 
Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006 (Miss. 2004). 
29. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
30. From the fundamentalist point of view, reasoning with me would require agnos-
ticism about God, rejection ofthe Bible as authority for public policy, and a pretty strong 
version of the harm principle and the invisible hand, stretched to its farthest reach. I 
wouldn't blame them in the least if they thought it was not worth their time. 
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cally with you about your premises, hoping you believe enough 
in the concept of consistency for me to shame you into abandon-
ing whatever is keeping you from agreeing with me. (And if I 
can't trust you enough to want to avoid obvious contradictions in 
your own beliefs, why should I trust you to join me on a common 
analysis nf those beliefs?) I can try to show you that your beliefs 
harm others, and hope you have some vision of a common hu-
manity I can appeal to. I can try to move sideways around our 
point of disagreement, or move up to a level of abstraction that 
blurs it, re-casting the issue in the hope of finding common 
ground between us, from which I might be able to persuade 
you.31 (Banning pornography is not about prudishness, you see, 
it's about equality.) I can also manipulate you with verbal trick-
ery. These methods are relatively easy and effective. 
Finally, I can lay my soul bare and do my best to entertain 
honestly and without manipulative intent the premises you hold 
dear. I agree with Professor Garver that this approach generates 
a sense of common purpose the others do not. I do not think it 
happens very often (he does not say it does). I would like to 
think it is so obviously worth the effort that it deserves to be 
called more ethical than the other approaches but, at least to the 
extent that the ethics of practical reason take into account such 
practical things as the different social costs of different strate-
gies, I am not so sure. 
II 
In this section, I want to argue that the institutional facts of 
litigation limit (though they do not eliminate entirely) what ethi-
cal criticism can teach us about judicial reasoning. There are a 
lot of possible objections-opinions are often written by commit-
tee and often reflect compromise more than the candid feelings 
of individual justices, for example-but I want to focus on three 
facts: Very few people read opinions; reasoning in litigation is 
mandatory, not optional; and litigation produces results as well 
as arguments. 
Professor Garver notes that, when Earl Warren became 
Chief Justice, Hugo Black advised him to read Aristotle's Rheto-
ric (p. 67). That fact is interesting, and it does fit nicely with the 
more familiar observation that Warren wanted to write a short 
31. Which is what the tiresome debate over the level at which rights should be for-
mulated is really all about. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). 
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opinion in Brown, one that would be easy for non-lawyers to 
read and which would not damn the South (p. 72). Professor 
Garver says the opinions needed to be readable by ordinary 
people "because it is they who decide whether the opinion is le-
gitimate, and this particular opinion had to be legitimate in order 
to be successful" (p. 72). This point is consistent with the idea 
that the speaker's ethos both is her own and is derived "via ar-
gument, from the audience" (p. 83), and with the idea that the 
ethos of the community and the judgments of the audience guard 
against excessive judicial creativity (pp. 200--01). 
But what if people do not read the opinion? I cannot prove 
it, but I don't think the opinion in Brown was read by many law-
yers in 1954, and by no more than a trivial number of lay peo-
ple.32 Probably most law students after 1954 have read edited 
versions of Brown, but I bet hardly any have read all of it. War-
ren's rhetoric did not stop the Southern Manifesto or massive re-
sistance to integration. It took soldiers with rifles, the public 
mauling of freedom riders, and pictures of redneck sheriffs set-
ting dogs and water canons on conservatively dressed protestors 
to fulfill the promise of Brown. 
From one angle, it does not matter that most people did not 
and have not read Warren's opinion. Ethical reasoning is no less 
ethical if it fails to persuade. It is the choice of the means of per-
suasion that matters, and Warren was right about the best way to 
write the opinion in Brown, regardless whether anyone read it. 
But what about the part of ethos derived from the audience 
through the argument? How can ethos be created by an argu-
ment that was and is "largely unread"?33 How can audience 
judgments about judicial reasoning reign in irresponsible judges 
when the audience sees only the result? I do not find answers to 
these questions in Professor Garver's book. 
My second and third facts are that litigation entails involun-
tary reasoning and that it produces results, not just reasons. I will 
take these points together. Suppose that, in addition to not really 
trusting you when you agree to my premises only for the sake of 
argument, I really don't want to be talking to you at all. I wish 
you would just leave me alone. At a minimum, this fact would 
complicate the ideas of friendship and community, yet litigation 
is like that. In almost all cases, neither party wants to be in court. 
32. See Randall Kennedy, Schoolings in Equality, NEW REPUBLIC, July 5 & 12, 
2004, at 32. 
33. /d. 
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Plaintiffs would rather not have to put up with whatever brought 
them to court, and defendants almost never want to be sued. 
How is friendship supposed to flourish in such an environment? 
This point is not a fatal flaw, because the Court is always speak-
ing to a much broader audience than the parties to particular 
cases, but it sets the right tone for thinking about opinions. 
The awkwardness of reasoning through litigation is com-
pounded by the fact that courts issue orders. It is fine to say that 
in Brown the Court placed before the nation a vision of equality 
the nation could consider, and which ultimately became a fun-
damental part of the American ethos. But the Court did not say 
"let us consider what the world would be like if we treated black 
children as equal human beings." It said: "treat black children as 
equal human beings." At least in the near term, the Court does 
not reason with the nation about ends, it orders that some end 
be pursued (in Brown) or recognized as law (in most other 
cases). Most people cared more about the result in Brown than 
the reasoning. Reasoning might make things worse- if Warren 
had written about Southerners as H.L. Mencken did, Southern-
ers would have been even angrier- but no amount of reasoning 
could hide the fact that the Court was condemning not just 
school segregation, but an entire way of life. Such condemnation 
is always more or less present in constitutional cases that try to 
alter culture. 
This point is related to my earlier point that there are some 
premises I will not accept, even for the sake of argument. Profes-
sor Garver acknowledges that "sometimes the only way to be 
friends with someone [who holds] radically different beliefs ... is 
to bracket the truth-claims of their beliefs and values ... " (p. 
186). I think that is right, but this point creates problems for Pro-
fessor Garver's claim that judicial reasoning can create relations 
of friendship. In every contested constitutional case, including 
Brown, some segment of society will be so at odds with the 
Court that it will not be able to accept the Court's premises, 
even for the sake of argument (which is not how judicial opin-
ions are supposed to be accepted anyway). The Court cannot 
bracket truth-claims, however, because its decisions establish (or 
at least try to establish) a new truth. 
It is a great flaw of academics (though not of Professor 
Garver's book) that we tend to discount preferences we do not 
share. (I suppose most people do that, but we at least claim to be 
better than most people at reasoning about such things.) Dis-
counting makes us feel better about arguing that the Court 
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should condemn those preferences and banish them from the 
law, but it is not very honest. Sad though it is, it is a mistake to 
underestimate the degree to which human beings base their 
sense of self on their relative position to others, and by extension 
the degree to which members of one group feel harmed by rul-
ings in favor of the other.34 
Professor John Donahue makes the point from a utilitarian 
point of view. He recounts telling a student that race relations in 
the South seemed to have progressed a lot; the student replies 
that he guesses that is right: his father no longer throws up when 
he sees a black man drink from a white drinking fountain.35 An 
honest utilitarian must count that reaction as disutility. Many 
conservative Christians see themselves as virtuous not just in the 
eyes of God but as opposed to (for example) sinful homosexuals, 
whose conduct is an "abomination." 
When the Court decides a case on such fundamental issues, 
it cannot help but put a boot in the face of the losing side. To say 
separate is not equal is to say the system of white domination is 
wrong and to call into question the relative status of many 
whites. To say gay men and lesbians are human beings entitled 
to the equal respect of the law is to say condemnation of them is 
wrong. If you believe the word of God condemns gays, it is to 
say that God's word is wrong,36 or at least does not deserve to be 
law. That is pretty heady stuff. None of this means that such de-
cisions are wrong, of course. (They roughly track the harm prin-
ciple, so people like me like them.) It does mean that large num-
bers of people will see the results in such cases as acts of 
aggression, not friendship. 
What you think of such things in the near term depends on 
whether the boot is on your foot or in your face. If I am on the 
losing side, why on Earth should I consider any opinion an act of 
34. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of 
Antigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv.1327, 
1377-78 (1995) ("[A]ntigay prejudice provides hedonic satisfaction to homophobes. For 
many people, homophobic feelings alleviate significant psychological problems, including 
sexual frustrations and feelings of personal inadequacy."), citing EUZABETH YOUNG-
BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF PREJUDICE (1996). 
35. John J. Donahue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Dis· 
crimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1591 (1994) (reviewing RIOIARD A. EPSTEIN, 
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
(1992)). 
36. Logically, the Court could write an opinion saying you were wrong about God's 
word. It would destroy its ethos as a secular institution if it tried that, however, and the 
opinion would be a disaster no matter how l?gical it might be, ~hich is ~hy we often see 
the Court channel J.S. Mill but we never see Jt debate the mearung of scnpture. 
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friendship? I cannot reply to you in any meaningful way. As 
noted above, Professor Garver acknowledges that sometimes it 
is friendlier to ignore fundamental differences than to fight 
about them. Litigation eliminates that option. I suppose Profes-
sor Garver could still respond that, even if the Court rules 
against your side, things could be worse. The Court could rule 
against you and reason insincerely, meaning it could both reject 
your position and show contempt for you in its reasoning. That 
would be worse, I suppose, but depending on how strongly you 
felt about the result, it might not be much worse. Either way, 
why should I be satisfied with you giving me the boot and taking 
responsibility for it? What kind of joint project is that? 
All discourse-based theories of adjudication have to wrestle 
with this problem, however.37 And this objection does not un-
dercut the force of Professor Garver's claim that ethos is critical 
to persuasion and the relations among persons different persua-
sive strategies create. An advocate who relies on arguments he 
does not actually accept as true, for example, is engaged in a dif-
ferent sort of dialogue than one who asserts only propositions he 
believes to be true. The difference does not come from the logic 
of an argument, because the rules of logjc do not require that the 
logician believe the propositions tested. 8 The difference is in the 
relations an advocate creates with an audience by virtue of his 
rhetorical choices. An advocate who asks you to believe an ar-
gument he does not believe himself is not your friend, though he 
may be a very effective advocate just the same. 
Professor Garver's argument suffers somewhat in the litiga-
tion environment, but I do not think it fails completely. That 
some portion of the public will perceive any decision as a kick in 
the face does not mean everyone will see it that way. Large por-
tions of the public may be willing to listen to the Court, and 
through ethical reasoning it may persuade them that it speaks for 
them as well as to them (p. 72). That any decision will feel like a 
kick to someone is not a warrant for sophistry. Neither is the fact 
that the Court commands more than it converses. Professor 
Garver is right to say that the choice of the means of persuasion 
37. For a generalizable criticism of such arguments, see Lund & McGinnis, supra 
note 6, at 1587-90. 
38. One can analogize this difference to the difference between logically valid ar-
guments, whose propositions need not be true, and logically sound arguments, whose 
logic if valid and whose propositions are true. An advocate who asserts only sound argu-
ments relates to an audience in a different way than an advocate who is willing to assert 
valid but unsound arguments. 
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is a choice of how to deal with each other, and therefore an ethi-
cal choice. To the extent his thesis applies to litigation, it pro-
vides a valuable perspective on an otherwise familiar problem. 
III 
I want to conclude by returning to the aspiration and the 
fear I mentioned at the beginning. I believe we should give up on 
part of the aspiration, and worry less about the fear. I'll take the 
second point first. 
The last section did not answer a question. What restrains 
judicial creativity if people do not read or do not care about ju-
dicial reasoning? Judicial self-interest. The Court does not want 
to lose its power, so it will not issue decisions that put that power 
at too much risk.39 If the Court is constrained, albeit in a very 
general way, why should we worry that its decisions are just 
rhetoric-even sophistic rhetoric? 
Professors Lund & McGinnis claim creative decisions harm 
the Court as an institution, which is the most common answer. I 
think the evidence refutes that claim to the extent it can be 
tested at all. People have more and more consistent faith in the 
Court than in other federal institutions, for example.40 And 
many of the Court's most obviously creative decisions are now 
considered beyond question. Brown, Griswold, Eisenstadt, and 
Loving, are as much a part of current American ethos as the 
document in which they cannot be found.41 
39. E.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
2596, 2606 (2003) ("the wealth of existing evidence suggests that most of the time judicial 
decisions fall within the range of acceptability that one might expect of the agents of 
popular government" (footnote omitted)); /d. at 2607 ("[I]n the main the results of Su-
preme Court decisionmaking comport with the preferences of a majority or at least a 
strong plurality, something that many political scientists now take as a given."); Jeffrey J. 
Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, The Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme 
Court, 59 J. POL. 1114, 1120 (1997). 
40. John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 
(2000). 
41. I list Brown as creative because the justices who decided it thought history was 
not on their side, a fact Professor McConnell's case does not alter. MICHAEL J. 
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 302-08 (2004). Professors Lund and 
McGinnis ask rhetorically, "if the Supreme Court doesn't take the Constitution seriously, 
why should anyone else?" It is an odd question, because in the real world people do take 
the Constitution seriously notwithstanding what Professors Lund and McGinnis see as 
the Court's brazen lawlessness. A pragmatic answer is that argument has to end some-
time, so that life can go on and people can do other things. From that perspective the 
Court's finality is a virtue regardless of the content of a wide range of possible decisions. 
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997). Judicial creativity does not erode support for the law 
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Roe has caused a lot of noise, it is true, and it altered na-
tional politics to a degree, but roughly half the country has sup-
ported it since the day it was decided, and there is no evidence it 
has harmed the Court's overall standing.42 Professors Lund and 
McGinnis are right to point out that 50% support would not se-
cure a constitutional amendment, but that just reminds us (if we 
needed reminding) that the boot was as present in Roe as in any 
other case. Popular divisions over Roe did not keep the Court's 
from deciding the 2000 election in favor of the candidate with 
the fewest popular votes,43 proclaiming a new era of state sover-
eignty, giving habeas rights to prisoners in Guantanamo Bay,44 
radically re-making criminal sentencing practices,45 or striking 
down the anti-sodomy law at issue in Lawrence v. Texas. 46 
There is no reason to expect creativity to get the Court into 
serious trouble in the future. Professor Post describes a "se-
renely confident" Court,47 and why not? The practice of judicial 
review grows stronger with exercise. As the country accepts 
creative decisions, they become more accustomed to such deci-
sions, making creativity less costly in the future, and therefore 
more likely. In purely political terms, liberals and conservatives 
both have some stake in creative judging. Each side wins some-
times. If you are a conservative you got Bush v. Gore and the 
proclamation that states are sovereign;48 you have to live with 
because accepting judicial finality works better for people than perpetual hand-wringing 
about democratic theory. 
42. On public opinion regarding abortion, see Michael Vitiello, How Imperial is the 
Supreme Court? An Analysis of Supreme Court Abortion Doctrine and Popular Will, 34 
U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 85 (1999), which concludes that 25 years of polling data show signifi· 
cant agreement between the Court's rulings and public opinion. For the datum that 
roughly half the population supports Roe, see id. at 86. Brian Bix reminds me that popu· 
lar divisions over Roe might have made the Court more timid than it would have been 
had Roe gone the other way. The Court might have been more willing to recognize a 
right to kill oneself, for example. Cf Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). This 
point is true though, as with all counterfactuals it is hard to prove. I believe the Court has 
been creative enough, and successfully so, to disprove the notion that it suffers from its 
creativity. 
43. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). It is worth noting that the public liked the 
opinion, see Yoo, supra note 40, at 778 n.21 (surveying surveys of public opinion on Bush 
v. Gore), though many scholars have argued that it was unprincipled. E.g., Laurence 
Tribe, The Unbearable Wrongness of Bush v. Gore, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 571 (2002). 
44. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
45. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 2% (2004). Justice Scalia's majority opinion 
denied the full implications of Blakely for the Sentencing Guidelines, id. at 308, as Justice 
Kennedy refused to commit to the implications of Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
46. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
47. Post, supra note 3, at 5. 
48. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
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Lawrence, Grutter,49 and Internet pomography.50 If you are lib-
eral, the reverse is true. The country's passivity over creative 
judging suggests most people think that's not too bad.51 Within 
the general parameters of popular opinion, it is true that the 
Court tends to impose elite values on the country, but it is also 
true that this fact worries elites more than it worries the coun-
try.sz 
These points bring us to the aspiration. Why do we want law 
to be logical? Without harping too much on Holmes or the real-
ists, I sometimes wonder if we want law to be logical because the 
goodness of a law is a function of the strictness of its logic or be-
cause logic is what we happen to be good at. If the law were 
strictly logical, then legal logicians (us) might influence its devel-
opment more, but that would not guarantee that logos-only law 
would benefit anyone else. Judicial practice suggests there must 
and should be more to law than logic. 
If we accept the "noncontroversial positive point" that the 
Constitution means what the Court can get away with saying it 
means, and if that fact implies that constitutional law will always 
outrun logic, then it follows that we cannot teach students about 
real-world constitutional law without teaching more than logic. 
Like it or not, to teach real-world constitutional law is to teach 
the evolution of constitutional ethos, which is to say it is to teach 
rhetoric. Maybe we condemn the word "rhetoric" to divert at-
tention from how well it applies to what we do. 
None of this means we should give up on logic. 53 Legal aca-
demics are (or at least should be) partisans of logic. Constructing 
logical legal arguments, and logical critiques of unsound argu-
ments, should be our stock-in-trade. If we have a comparative 
advantage over practicing lawyers-or the rhetoric, literature, or 
theater departments, for that matter-logical legal argument is 
it. That logic is our job does not mean it is the only job, however. 
It means instead that we can write about and teach only part of 
the way law works in the real world. There is nothing wrong with 
that. It is risky to ask for more. To the extent we have a com-
49. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
SO. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
51. Cf. Mondak & Smithey, supra note 39, at 1139 (noting that opposition gener-
ated by rulings a person dislikes may fade with time and subsequent favorable rulings). 
52. Friedman, supra note 15, at 158 ("(A)cademic fixation with the countermajori-
tarian problem differs significantly from popular criticism of the courts that appears as 
circumstances."). 
53. As Professor Garver puts it, "ethical argument is never illogical. It depends on 
logic, and then goes beyond what it is logically authorized to conclude." (p. 86) 
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parative advantage we have limited influence over the direction 
of the law; to the extent we seek such influence, we are likely to 
lose our comparative advantage. 
The problem, of course, is that teaching students about ethi-
cal reasoning is not the same thing as teaching ethical reasoning 
itself. How do we teach students to go beyond logos without 
abandoning or mocking it? Like judgment, I think ethical rea-
soning can be learned, but I doubt it can be taught. All we can 
hope for is that it can be shown, which is what Professor Garver 
has done in this book. 
